"Half of French Prisoners are Muslims"

"Half of French Prisoners are Muslims"

by Emre Demir ("Zaman Online," June 01, 2006)

Strasbourg, France - Half of those being detained in French prisons are said to be Muslims.

A Le Monde news article wrote that according to a poll run by “Religions World” magazine, although Muslims constitute 7-8 percent of the French population, 50 percent of all prisoners are Muslim immigrants.

The percentage rises to 80 percent in suburbs mostly populated by immigrants.

International Prison Observation Center President Gabriel Mouesca said that socio-economic conditions not the religion is effective in why half of all French prisoners are Muslims. Despite Islam being the most common religion in prisons, Muslim convicts have many problems. The biggest one is not being able to exercise their religious obligations comfortably. The lack of small mosques, in addition to religious officials, is another concern for Muslims who are also complaining about the food served in prisons.

Secular Syria allows Islam to flourish"

"Secular Syria allows Islam to flourish"

("IRIN News," June 01, 2006)

Damascus, Syria - The three Muhammads were all sure of one thing. "I want to be the imam of a mosque," says ten-year old Muhammad, on his way home from a lesson in Aleppo's Islamic school. "I want to be a preacher too," chimes his friend, also named after the Prophet of Islam, dressed in his finest black gelab.

"We like to study the Qu'ran," explains the third Muhammad, also a resident of Syria's second city, "because it's our religion."

Internationally isolated and facing continuing domestic opposition, Syria is witnessing a revival of Islam in public and private life two decades after the secular government fought a bloody campaign to suppress an armed uprising against the state by Islamic extremists.

"The relationship between the government and the direction of Islam is now suitable," said Muhammad Habbash, the country's leading Islamist MP and head of the Islamic Studies Centre in Damascus. "We can now speak about what role Islam can play in people's lives."

Habbash's recent invitation to lecture army cadets on religious morals – the first time the Syrian military has officially cooperated with Islamist figures since the ruling Ba'ath party came to power in 1963 – is just one of a series of recent moves to allow Islam into public life by a state that once stopped at nothing to suppress it.

In 1982, following a three-year terrorist campaign against the state by the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood, security officers ordered the shelling of the central city of Hama, which the Brotherhood had declared an Islamic emirate. The offensive resulted in the deaths of an estimated 20,000 people.

Hamed Haji, the 73-year-old muezzin whose call to prayer draws students – like the three young Muhammads – to Aleppo's Islamic school, remembers the violence. "In the 1980s, bullets hit the minaret," he recalls, pointing up to the pock-marked circles of stone. "And beards were not allowed; but we have more freedoms now."

Indeed, the past few months have seen a number of moves aimed at institutionalising Islam into Syria's old secular state. Mosques have been re-opened between prayer times, the president has begun ending public speeches with invocations to Allah and state auditoriums have been used for the country's first Qur'an reading competition.

In February, Syrian protesters burned and looted the Danish and Norwegian embassies in Damascus in a display of anger against the publication of cartoons negatively depicting the Prophet Mohammed. At the time, security officials did little to quell the demonstrations, which were organised by Islamic study centres in the capital.

Among citizens, too, overt signs of religious devotion are becoming more frequent. An increasing number of young women are wearing headscarves, while green flags – representing Islam – adorned private shops on the Prophet's birthday in April.

Though three quarters of Syria's population are Sunni Muslim, the ruling party has long drawn its leaders from the minority Allawi sect, an offshoot of Shi'a Islam, which – along with Druze and other Muslim sects – makes up just 16 percent of the national population. Pan-Arab and secular, the Ba'ath Party has historically ruled on a domestic platform of protecting the rights of Syria's minorities.

For Habbash, the state's changing approach to Islam comes against a backdrop of regional upheaval since the launch of the US-led "war on terrorism", which has seen Islamist parties winning elections in Iraq and Palestine, escalating conflict between Israel and Islamist militia groups in Lebanon and an increasingly influential role for long-time Syrian ally and theocratic republic Iran. "The Syrian regime realised it has the same agenda as conservative Islamists," said Habbash. "They've formed an alliance to resist the current US administration's plan to change the region."

However, warns Aleppo's Mufti Ibrahim Salkeeni, US intervention in the Middle East has also served to radicalise many young Syrians. "American practises in Iraq and Palestine are pushing some young people in Aleppo to become like time bombs – and we don't know when these will explode," he said. "The more the pressure increases, the more explosions there will be."

With daily terror attacks in neighbouring Iraq, many ostensibly claimed by Islamic extremist organisations, security forces have waged a public campaign against Islamist groups operating inside Syria. Dozens of clashes between Syrian anti-terrorism forces and militant groups have been reported by official state news agency SANA. One such group, Jund as-Sham, or "Soldiers of the Levant", has reportedly planned terror attacks against public buildings in Damascus.

"Syria is aiming to change its policy of silence on these issues," said Imad Fauzi Shueibi, head of the Data and Strategic Studies Centre in Damascus, in an interview last year. "It wants to show the US that Syria is supporting the campaign against terrorism."

The Muslim Brotherhood, whose exiled leader Ali Sadradeen Bayanouni recently united with former Syrian Vice President Abdel-Halim Khaddam to lead an opposition group calling for regime change in Damascus, remains outlawed. Association with the group is punishable by death. "The Muslim Brotherhood represents perhaps two percent of Syrian Muslims," said Sheikh Mahmoud Abu Hudda, an Aleppo dentist and Islamic scholar who has lectured in Europe and the US on Islam's place in what he calls the "global culture".

Though independent political parties are not legal under the autocratic Syrian regime, senior members of the Ba'ath party are currently negotiating the introduction of a new Parties Law that would grant licenses to those parties not based on ethnic identity or religion.

For Mohammed Akam, professor of Arabic-language studies at Aleppo University, the state's increasing acceptance of Islam's role in society is a welcome development. Nevertheless, he added, the new strategy is no substitute for the reformation of an outdated political system. "The conflict between the state and the Muslim Brotherhood was actually a conflict of ideologies," he argued. "We need a party without ideology. Between secularism and freedom, I prefer freedom. Secularism is a kind of ideology, but democracy is a way of including all."

Remembering Tun Razak

Remembering Tun Razak
M. Bakri Musa
www.bakrimusa.com


Thirty years ago on January 14, 1976, our nation was stunned with the sudden and unexpected announcement of the death of its Prime Minister, Tun Razak. He was only 53 years old, much younger than some UMNO Youth leaders. It turned out later that only the announcement was unexpected.
The Tun had been suffering for a few years from a lethal form of cancer. His physicians and advisors had kept that news secret not only from the citizens but also presumably from his family. This great patriot died in a foreign land among strangers and without his loving family at his bedside.
I had always wondered what advice the Tun’s physicians and closest advisors gave him when they knew the end was near. I could not fathom why he and they did not take the nation into their confidence and share the grim news of his serious illness much earlier.
As a surgeon, I am intimately involved in the care of my patients who are at the end of their life. When death is imminent, I always apprise them and their families of the sad reality so I could discern their wishes. I do everything possible to comply with their requests.


Inspiring Role Model

Tun Razak’s death came a few days after I returned to Malaysia with the intention of staying permanently. I had been away for over a decade; he was the reason for my returning.
A few years earlier I had finished my training and started my private practice abroad. I also had a young family on the way, and life was good. However I had the unsettled feeling that I was not quite ready for the life of a suburbanite with a station wagon and a dog, together with a cottage at the lakeside.
Longing for my roots, I began reading about Malaysia, and came upon a sympathetic article on the late Tun. While hitherto my heroes had been the brilliant scientists and legendary surgeons I work with, now I had someone from my own culture to look up to.
I was impressed by the Tun’s outstanding achievements at Malay College, where he excelled academically as well as on the playing field. Later as a brilliant young civil servant, his British superiors recognized his talent and sent him to Britain to read law.
Looking over his early life, I could not help but admire his willingness to give up what seemed like a very promising and secure career in the civil service to pursue the then highly unpredictable and uncertain field of politics. Many of its practitioners had ended up being jailed, exiled, or worse.
Even more admirable, the Tun could just as easily have stayed back in Britain and started a lucrative practice as a barrister there, or applied his considerable managerial and executive talent working for one of the British corporations. He could have had a very rewarding career over there.
That he opted not to do so and returned home to serve his country inspired me to do likewise. I was unabashedly modeling myself after him except for this very significant difference. I had no love for politics; I would serve in my chosen profession instead.
Nearly two decades earlier, the Tun had visited my old school in Kuala Pilah and had exhorted us, especially Malay students, to opt for the sciences. Fortunately, science, especially medicine, is my passion, and I will serve in that field. That they were then too few Malays pursuing the sciences only increased my resolve to do my part in remedying the situation.
When I returned I settled my young family in my parent’s home in Seremban while I was busy making frequent day trips to Kuala Lumpur to arrange for my job. I had greatly underestimated the ability of the Malaysian bureaucracy to throw hurdles on my path. As one of the few Malay surgeons then (or even now), I had expected a welcome just short of that reserved for the return of the prodigal son. Far from it!
It was after a frustrating trip to the Ministry of Health that I returned to my parent’s home only to be stunned by that tragic news of the Tun’s death. I felt as if the air had been sucked out of me. There was a sudden emptiness in me. The tribulations I had earlier with the recalcitrant civil servants at the ministry seemed so trivial.


Enduring Legacy

Tun Razak saw early the importance of investing in his people as shown by his commitment to rural development and to education. On looking back, the one sight that I took very much for granted during my youth in the 1950s was the ubiquitous building of new schools especially in rural areas. I also remember seeing the joy in the eyes of illiterate villagers who could now read the daily papers, thanks to the adult literacy classes started by Tun Razak. He also expanded Malay education hitherto available only at the primary level, right up to the university.
His education policy was not without blemish. While he modernized education in the Malay language, but others read that as a signal for them to ignore English. While he could restrain the more extremist language nationalists, his successors were more than eager to pander to them.
His modernizing education in the Malay stream encouraged many Malays to pursue their education. The Tun however was pragmatic; he sent his own children to English schools, in Britain no less. Others may charge hypocrisy, but I am certain that his children are grateful that their father had chosen for them a superior education despite the considerable political risks he would incur.
It was the Tun, together with Indonesia’s Adam Malik, who ended the totally unnecessary and utterly destructive konfrontasi that had wasted so much resources and energy from the two nations. Both leaders successfully overcame the egotistic stubbornness of their superior (the Tunku for the Tun, and Sukarno for Adam Malik) and quickly came to an agreement.
A few years later, the Tun would once again be the nation’s savior, literally. It was he, and not the hapless Tunku, who brought law and order – and then peace – following the nation’s most harrowing experience, the 1969 race riots.
Two of the Tun’s greatest legacies deserve deeper scrutiny: The New Economic Policy (NEP), spawned immediately following the 1969 riots, and the Government-Linked Companies (GLCs).
In the NEP, the Tun implicitly recognized that economic growth alone, unless accompanied by social and economic equities, would be very destabilizing and thus not sustainable. In this, he anticipated the thinking of progressive development economists by decades. Today it is the accepted wisdom.
When he formulated the NEP, the Tun did not hesitate to challenge accepted orthodoxy. Today, a generation later, we must again emulate the Tun’s boldness in challenging the status quo in revamping the successors to the NEP.
Similarly, establishing the GLCs was the Tun’s creative way to overcome the creakiness and rigidities of the civil service. It was also his recognition that the prevailing economic milieu then in Malaysia was far from being truly competitive. He used the power of government through these GLCs to open up the market and break down the de facto monopolies then in existence. The role played by his GLCs is a far cry from the resource-consuming and corruption-ridden variety in existence today.
I had never had the privilege of meeting the late Tun. Yet thirty years after his death, reminded by his many achievements and enduring legacy, I am still inspired by this great Malaysian.

For the DAP it’s once bitten, twice shy

The New Straits Times, Kuala Lumpur
14 January 2006


OPINION: For the DAP it’s once bitten, twice shy
Chow Kum Hor

Despite toying with the idea of strategic alliances and cooperating
with other Opposition parties, the DAP is likely to go it alone in
the next elections, writes CHOW KUM HOR.

PICTURE Datuk Seri Anwar Ibrahim addressing the Democratic Action
Party top brass in a retreat, throw in the element of secrecy
surrounding the meeting and it won’t take long for speculation about
the party reviving formal ties with other Opposition parties to gain
a foothold.

Parti Keadilan Rakyat (PKR) information chief Tian Chua may have
added to the rumour mill when he told the Chinese newspapers that
Anwar, the PKR adviser, had called on the DAP to forge an Opposition
alliance during his speech.

DAP leaders, including secretary-general Lim Guan Eng, have denied
that Anwar even broached the subject during the latter’s 20-minute
talk in Cameron Highlands last weekend.

"But we are open to co-operation with any party which does not have
the setting up of an Islamic State as its agenda," says Lim.

Despite the semantics about whether "co-operation" is preferable to
"coalition", the truth is DAP leaders are now deeply wary about how
even the slightest link with other Opposition groups could affect the
party.

After all, the DAP walked out of the Opposition Front (better known
by its Malay acronym, BA) in 2001, following disenchantment with
fellow coalition member Pas over the latter’s insistence on setting
up an Islamic state.

This came about after the DAP’s dismal showing in the 1999 general
election, where even its traditional supporters deserted the Chinese-
based party faster than Karpal Singh could repeat his infamous "over
my dead body" remark. (Karpal had made the comment in 1990 on Pas’
plans to set up an Islamic state.)

The party’s decision to go solo in the 2004 poll paid off when it won
12 parliamentary seats, making it the largest Opposition party in the
Dewan Rakyat.

Lim Kit Siang was reinstated as Opposition Leader while Karpal also
returned to the legislature after their defeat five years earlier.

But has the party, by even toying with the idea of co-operation with
other Opposition parties, forgotten the bitter lesson of 1999 when it
suffered its worst-ever electoral performance?

Those in favour of some form of arrangement with other Opposition
parties argue that the situation has changed considerably since then.

PKR vice-president Azmin Ali, who was invited with Anwar to Cameron
Highlands, says the PKR has publicly asked Pas to reconsider its
platform if Pas is serious about winning over the Malaysian public.

"Pas has not been raising the Islamic state issue for some time now.
In fact, Pas has started to moderate its image after the last general
election. It is a non-issue at the moment," he says.

The argument goes that if the prickly issue of an Islamic state is
out of the way, DAP would have no problem fighting alongside Pas in
the next general election.

But Pas’ re-branding exercise, to shed its hardline Islamic image in
favour of a more moderate one, still falls short of the DAP’s demand
that Pas drop its Islamic state stance.

Even the most optimistic DAP leader does not see Pas abandoning its
Islamic state objective, which has formed one of the party’s core
principles.

The Merdeka Centre think-tank’s Ibrahim Suffian says there are also
lingering trust issues between the DAP and Pas, especially after the
debacle over BA’s 1999 manifesto.

The common manifesto was silent on the setting up of an Islamic state
but no sooner had the general election been concluded than Pas was
back to insisting that it would set up an Islamic state if it came to
power. But for PKR, some form of understanding with the DAP could
alleviate the problem of both parties contesting in the same
constituency — a phenomenon that resulted in split Opposition votes
in 2004 in some areas.

As much as PKR needs to extend its base beyond the Malay ground, DAP
also wants to shed its Chinese-centric image as a long-term strategic
move.

"There are also people in the DAP who take a long view of the party,"
says Ibrahim.

"With dwindling Chinese-majority seats, the DAP has to look at co-
operation with other parties for its long-term survival.

"It cannot continue to be boxed up as a Chinese party."

While DAP leaders such as Lim have not ruled out ties within the
Opposition, political reality suggests that they stand to gain more
as a "niche party". The experience in 1999 has taught the DAP that
the groundswell, which saw the Opposition as a whole making
significant inroads, may not necessarily benefit the party.

In fact, DAP took a severe beating.

A DAP insider says the poll was a wake-up call for the party to stay
true to its principles of defending the 1957 Constitution, instead of
working with a party with the expressed aim of setting up an Islamic
state.

"It is pointless for the party to think long-term (on matters such as
forging links with Malay-based parties) if in the short term, the
party cannot even stay afloat by winning elections," he says.

Emerging wiser from the lesson, the party appears to have adopted the
"DAP-first" mentality, as opposed to "Opposition first".

As for Anwar, a DAP central executive committee (CEC) member says:
"Between the DAP and Pas, I believe Anwar, with his Islamic
background, is more inclined towards Pas, notwithstanding his
rhetoric about asking the party to review its Islamic state position.

"He needs the Malay-Muslim platform more.

"His support base has always been this group of people. Personally, I
think we have to tread carefully."

Lim says there are many issues to be thrashed out before the DAP
moves towards forming an alliance — loose or otherwise — with other
Opposition parties.

But the underlying principle is that the "partner" must not have the
setting up of an Islamic state as its objective.

"We want a coalition of substance, not convenience. We do not want
political spins."

But would DAP agree to an alliance with PKR and not Pas? In the 1990
and 1995 polls, the DAP and Malay-based Semangat 46 were under the
Gagasan Rakyat coalition.

Semangat 46, on the other hand, joined forces with Pas and other
Islamic parties in another Opposition coalition, the Angkatan
Perpaduan Ummah (APU).

Although Lim says it is too early to tell, party leaders are still
spooked by the idea of being associated with other Opposition
parties, even non-Islamic ones which share the same platform as Pas.

"You can’t divorce a person and then regularly meet him or her in
public.

"This is especially so after DAP slammed its door on BA," the DAP
insider says.

"Having even an indirect link with Pas now is just as bad, if not
worse than the time when DAP and Pas were coalition partners.

"If we go back in any way, we will be treated with suspicion."

The DAP has learnt a lesson the hard way — that they can do without
voters’ suspicion, which can be unforgiving.

Ends

Judas the Misunderstood

The Times, London


Europe

The Times
January 12, 2006

Judas the Misunderstood
From Richard Owen, in Rome
Vatican moves to clear reviled disciple’s name


JUDAS ISCARIOT, the disciple who betrayed Jesus with a kiss, is to be
given a makeover by Vatican scholars.

The proposed “rehabilitation” of the man who was paid 30 pieces of
silver to identify Jesus to Roman soldiers in the Garden of
Gethsemane, comes on the ground that he was not deliberately evil,
but was just “fulfilling his part in God’s plan”.

Christians have traditionally blamed Judas for aiding and abetting
the Crucifixion, and his name is synonymous with treachery. According
to St Luke, Judas was “possessed by Satan”.

Now, a campaign led by Monsignor Walter Brandmuller, head of the
Pontifical Committee for Historical Science, is aimed at persuading
believers to look kindly at a man reviled for 2,000 years.

Mgr Brandmuller told fellow scholars it was time for a “re-reading”
of the Judas story. He is supported by Vittorio Messori, a prominent
Catholic writer close to both Pope Benedict XVI and the late John
Paul II.

Signor Messori said that the rehabilitation of Judas would “resolve
the problem of an apparent lack of mercy by Jesus toward one of his
closest collaborators”.

He told La Stampa that there was a Christian tradition that held that
Judas was forgiven by Jesus and ordered to purify himself with
“spiritual exercises” in the desert.

In scholarly circles, it has long been unfashionable to demonise
Judas and Catholics in Britain are likely to welcome Judas’s
rehabilitation.

Father Allen Morris, Christian Life and Worship secretary for the
Catholic Bishops of England and Wales, said: “If Christ died for all
— is it possible that Judas too was redeemed through the Master he
betrayed?” The “rehabilitation” of Judas could help the Pope’s drive
to improve Christian-Jewish relations, which he has made a priority
of his pontificate.

Some Bible experts say Judas was “a victim of a theological libel
which helped to create anti Semitism” by forming an image of him as a
“sinister villain” prepared to betray for money.

In many medieval plays and paintings Judas is portrayed with a hooked
nose and exaggerated Semitic features. In Dante’s Inferno, Judas is
relegated to the lowest pits of Hell, where he is devoured by a three-
headed demon.

The move to clear Judas’s name coincides with plans to publish the
alleged Gospel of Judas for the first time in English, German and
French. Though not written by Judas, it is said to reflect the belief
among early Christians — now gaining ground in the Vatican — that in
betraying Christ Judas was fulfilling a divine mission, which led to
the arrest and Crucifixion of Jesus and hence to man’s salvation.

Mgr Brandmuller said that he expected “no new historical evidence”
from the supposed gospel, which had been excluded from the canon of
accepted Scripture.

But it could “serve to reconstruct the events and context of Christ’s
teachings as they were seen by the early Christians”. This included
that Jesus had always preached “forgiveness for one’s enemies”.

Some Vatican scholars have expressed concern over the reconsideration
of Judas. Monsignor Giovanni D’Ercole, a Vatican theologian, said it
was “dangerous to re-evaulate Judas and muddy the Gospel accounts by
reference to apocryphal writings. This can only create confusion in
believers.” The Gospels tell how Judas later returned the 30 pieces
of silver — his “blood money” — and h anged himself, or according to
the Acts of the Apostles, “fell headlong and burst open so that all
his entrails burst out”.

Some accounts suggest he acted out of disappointment that Jesus was
not a revolutionary who intended to overthrow Roman occupation and
establish “God’s Kingdom on Earth”.

In the Gospel accounts, Jesus reveals to the disciples at the Last
Supper that one of them will betray him, but does not say which. He
adds “Woe to that man by whom the Son of Man is betrayed! It would
have been better for that man if he had not been born.”

But he also — according to St Matthew — acknowledged that Judas had a
divine function to fulfil, saying to him during the arrest, “Friend,
do what you are here to do” and adding that “the prophecies of the
Scriptures must be fulfilled”.

The “Gospel of Judas”, a 62-page worn and tattered papyrus, was found
in Egypt half a century ago and later sold by antiquities dealers to
the Maecenas Foundation in Basle, Switzerland.

MOCK OF AGES

In Dante’s Inferno, Judas is relegated to the lowest pits of Hell,
where he is eaten, head first, by a three-headed demon with flapping
bat-like wings

In Cecil B. DeMille’s 1927 silent film The King of Kings, Judas’s
attraction for Mary Magdalene and the resulting jealousy contributes
to his betrayal of Jesus

Tim Rice and Andrew Lloyd-Webber’s musical Jesus Christ Superstar
depicts Judas as a disillusioned, angry character. In the 1973 film
version he is presented as more of a victim than villain

Mel Gibson’s The Passion of the Christ shows Judas hounded by demon-
like street children who send him to his death amid a sea of insects
and maggots

Apa Muslihat Persidangan Meja Bulat DAP di Parlimen, Jan 2006

Apa Muslihat Persidangan Meja Bulat DAP di Parlimen

ROSLAN SMS

Adakah Allahyarham Sarjan Mohammad bin Abdullah a.k.a Moorthy seorang Muslim ataupun tidak? Menurut proses undang-undang, Mahkamah Tinggi Syariah setelah mendengar permohonan pihak Jabatan Agama Islam Wilayah Persekutuan (JAWI) dan telah pun memutuskan bahawa berdasarkan bukti-bukti yang telah dibentangkan Allahyarham SAH seorang Muslim dan perlu dikebumikan menurut peraturan Islam.

Pihak keluarga Allahyarham yang masih belum beragama Islam telah melalui proses undang-undang membuat! pula permohonan di Mahkamah Tinggi Sivil bagi membatalkan keputusan ini dan mengisytiharkan bahawa Allahyarham sebenarnya seorang HINDU dan bukan Muslim.



Mahkamah Tinggi Rayuan Khas telah mendengar permohonan isteri Allahyarham itu dan telah memutuskan berdasarkan Perkara 121 (1) (A) Perlembagaan Persekutuan, mahkamah sivil tidak memiliki bidangkuasa menyemak atau membatalkan mana-mana keputusan Mahkamah Syariah dan oleh itu telah menolak permohonan tersebut. Lalu jenazah Allahyarham telah disemadikan menurut peraturan Islam pada hari itu juga setelah mahkamah yang sama enggan memberi perintah tahanan. Isteri Allahyarham telah pun memfailkan rayuan ke Mahkamah Rayuan.

Apa yang mahu saya utarakan di sini bahawa segala-gala sorotan di atas telah melalui proses undang-undang d! an bukannya dibuat melalui pintu belakang. Walaupun secara peribadi ada beberapa perkara yang saya tidak bersetuju dengan pihak JAWI namun dalam hal ini saya kira sebagai badan yang berwibawa dan memelihara hal-ehwal masayarakat Islam pihak JAWI telah melakukan tugasnya.

Kalaulah mayat tersebut contohnya adalah mayat Joshua Jamaluddin (hamba Allah paderi Kristian Melayu yang pernah ditahan di bawah ISA dahulu) siapa pun tidak akan berminat menuntutnya kerana jelas telah mengisytiharkan dirinya murtad dan memeluk Kristian. Manakala dalam kes Allahyarham ini beliau meninggal dalam keadaan beragama Islam dan tidak pula pernah membuat permohonan sebaliknya sehinggalah meninggal dunia.

Isu ini memang sensitif dan rakyat Malaysia khasnya pimpinan DAP, Hindu Sangam dan lain-lain NGO bukan Islam perlu sedar bahawa bukan hanya isteri Allahyarham malah kami masyarakat Islam pun terhiris hati dan perasaan apabila masyarakat bukan Islam secara terbuka membahas dan mengkritik! perkara ini serta memperlekehkan kuasa dan wibawa JAWI.

Tidak pernah dalam sejarah hidup saya menyaksikan ISLAM secara terbuka duduk dikandang orang salah dan diperbahaskan secara terang-terangan oleh masyarakat bukan Islam.

Memang kita mahu mengamalkan kebasan dan hak bersuara akan tetapi janganlah sampai keadilan dan kesaksamaan ISLAM turut menjadi bahan perbahasan dan pertikaian sehingga seolah-olah masyarakat Islam dalam negara ini dilihat sebagai dungu, bisu dan buta belaka!

Kit Siang dan pemuka-pemukanya marah kepada Perkara 121 (1) (A) Perlembagaan Persekutuan kerana kononnya mematikan hak masyarakat bukan Islam untuk membuat permohonan di mahkamah sivil berkenaan pertikaian mengenai ISLAM. Artikel tersebut kononnya merampas hak masyarakat bukan Islam.

Kit Siang juga marahkan sikap hakim mahkamah rayuan tempoh hari kerana enggan melaksanakan kuasanya dan memberikan pentafsiran yang sempit terhadap Perkara 121 (1) (A), tidakkah ini CONTEMPT OF COUR! T ataupun penghinaan terhadap mahkamah!

Antara resolusi persidangan Meja Bulat Kit Siang itu yang telah pun diserahkan ke kerajaan adalah:

Resolution 1
Mengembalikan Perkara 121 Perlembagaan Persekutuan ke maksud asalnya pada tahun 1988 sebelum dipinda

Resolution 2
Mendesak Perdana Menteri menubuhkan JK Terpilih Parlimen untuk membincangkan masalah yang ditimbulkan oleh Perkara 121 (1) (A)

Resolution 3
Masyarakat kebanyakkan merasa bimbang dan tidak berpuas hati terhadap penafian keadilan dalam kes Moorthy dan kes-kes lain seumpamanya.

Resolution 4
Forum ini merakamkan kebimbangannya terhadap sikap kebanyakkan pihak berkuasa agama negeri-negeri dalam perlaksanaan undag-undang Islam khasnya yang melibatkan masyrarakt bukan Islam.

Resolution 5
Mendesak agar Peguam Negara bertindak demi kepentingan masyarakat ramai dalam kes Moorthy dan kes-kes seumpamanya bagi mencerminkan hak persamaan semua rakyat dengan mengambil kira nilai-nilai persamaan tanpa mengira kaum dan agam yang dijamin oleh perlembagaan persekutuan.

Saya kongsi bersama berikut beberapa reaksi dalam BLOG Kit Siang berkenaan persidangan ini:

yangyang Said:January 5th, 2006 at 19: 14.21
Uncle Lim, as always – u r our jiu xin.Happy New Year!

Libra2 Said:January 5th, 2006 at 19: 27.54
Syabas to kit for calling for this round table conference. The remarkable attendance is a clear indication of the non Muslims concern over the recent Moorty! s case and the seriousness of the issue. I am also proud of the Malays who attended the conference. Malik and Zaid have always been upright and level headed man.

But I am disappointed none of the MCA and MIC leaders bothered to attend this function. As though this is a non-issue. To all MCA, MIC leaders, – come next election, dont enter my house compound to fish for votes. You will be chased out, I promise you.

sheriff singh Said:January 5th, 2006 at 19: 51.15
The position of Islam vis a vis the other religions must be clarified so that there is no ambiguity. There should not be a position of one religion being superior or having preference over the others whenever there is a conflict. The amendments must put in place a mechanism for resolving religious conflicts or ambiguities. There must be mutual respe! ct, sensitivity and fairness for all believers.

Most importantly, any proposed amendments must clarify the statement once a muslim, always a muslim i.e. you can get in but you cant get out.

There have been too many cases where born and converted muslims want out as they have joined other faiths but it is the muslim religious authorities that decides their fate even though these non-believers now no longer recognise their authority. They have been left in limbo and helpless to do anything. Statutory declarations don’t get you anywhere, you are still recognised as muslims. This anomaly must be removed so that those who leave Islam can have their new faiths registered and recognised by the government. And there will be no disputes as to their religious belief when they die. Let God be the judge.

Dan akhbar NST hari ini memaparkan satu muka penuh tajuk berikut:

It wont happen again. Government looki! ng at options to prevent a recurrence of legal wrangling.

Ianya tidak akan terjadi lagi. Kerajaan sedang menimbangkan pilihan untuk memastikan pertikaian undang-undang seumpama ini tidak berulang lagi.

Saya berharap pihak kerajaan janganlah seghairah Kit Siang dalam menangani isu ini. Kita mahu keadilan untuk semua dan dalam kes Allahyarham DAP sendiri sehingga menghantar ahli parlimennya Kulasegaran sebagai salah seorang peguam untuk isteri beliau. Namun mereka tidak berjaya, dan kini menunggu proses rayuan di mahkamah.

Keadilan bermula apabila semua pihak mematuhi undang-undang dan dalam hal ini Perkara 121 (1) (A) adalah jelas. Jika Kit Siang dan pemuka-pemukanya tidak berpuas hati maka buatlah pindaan di Parlimen, itulah proses sebenar yang perlu dilalui. Menjaja perkara se sensitif ini di tepi-tepi jalan akan hanya membakar api permusuhan dan akhirnya yang akan mati adalah keadilan itu sendiri.

Saya harap DAP dan NGO yang besertany! a akan mematuhi proses undang-undang. Dan sebanyak mana mereka mahukan hak mereka itu dihormati dan dipelihara, mereka juga seharusnya menghormati dan memelihara hak masyarakat Islam yang merupakan majoriti dalam negara ini, yang merupakan masyarakat yang sentiasa toleran dan terbuka dalam hal-hal perbezaan kaum dan agama. Jangan sampai ianya berubah!

Time for a change of players?

The Star, Kuala Lumpur
08 January 2006


Time for a change of players?

The guessing game may soon be over as the Prime Minister is said to be
in the final stages of deciding on changes to his Cabinet. But
opinions about whether it will be a major or minor reshuffle vary,
writes JOCELINE TAN.

DATUK Annuar Zaini’s football analogy for the impending Cabinet
reshuffle seems to have captured the imagination of many.

Annuar, who is also Bernama chairman, had likened Prime Minister Datuk
Seri Abdullah Ahmad Badawi to the team manager, the Cabinet to the
football team and the expected reshuffle as half-time in the game.

“The first half of the game is about over and it’s now nearing
half-time. Time to make some changes,” said Annuar.

His analogy has caught on particularly given that the European
football season or what some call the “gila-gila bola” season is now
in full swing.

“This is the time the team manager will substitute players ? people
who are not playing well, lost their stamina or who are injured. Or he
may reposition the players,” Annuar added.

So will the team manager be making major changes at half-time?

Said Annuar rather enigmatically: “Big, small or medium, it’s all very
subjective. How the manager reads the game can be quite different from
the expectations of the spectators.”

For that matter, the team manager himself has been difficult to read.

Abdullah has kept the reshuffle plans close to his chest.

It has been a mother of all headaches, trying to second-guess the
Prime Minister, so much so that some in Umno Youth have begun
referring to the reshuffle as “Rahsia besar Pak Lah” (Pak Lah’s big
secret).

Predictions that the Prime Minister would announce the reshuffle late
last year had resulted in egg on the face of those doing the
predicting. It has been very embarrassing, especially for the
journalists involved.

But as political insider Annuar said, now is about half-time and many
are convinced that the reshuffle will take place very soon.

“It's around the corner,” said a top aide to a minister.

Said another ministerial aide: “The general view is that it’s
overdue.”

This time around, those in the political loop are convinced that it is
going to take place very soon.

Abdullah hinted as much when inspecting the floods situation in
Terengganu several weeks ago.

He confirmed there would be a reshuffle and that if it did not happen
in December then it would take place in January.

Like many of his Cabinet members, the No 1 took a family holiday
abroad towards the year end.

Many of his party members assumed he would spend his holiday thinking
about the reshuffle but the family man in him probably turned his
attention entirely to his family during the break.

Other ministers on their own vacations probably spent more time
thinking about the reshuffle than him, particularly about whether they
would be affected.

Abdullah returned from abroad on Jan 1 and is still on leave.

He is said to be using the time away from the office to seriously
dwell on the Cabinet changes needed to take the Barisan Nasional into
the next general election.

But the 64-million-dollar-question still remains: Is the Prime
Minister looking at a major or minor reshuffle?

One would have thought that after so many months speculating on the
reshuffle and trying to read into Abdullah’s words and statements,
people would be more enlightened.

“Better not ask me, I’m also confused. The PM is tougher to read than
Dr Mahathir,” said a senior Cabinet member.

Names of who may rise or fall or who is moving where have been talked
and written about but a great deal of it is still largely speculation
and conjecture.

And it explains why opinions about the nature of the changes vary so
dramatically.

One school of thought is convinced that the reshuffle will be big with
some pretty senior names being dropped.

Despite the fact that Abdullah replaced a total of five full ministers
when he formed his Cabinet after the general election, this group is
of the view that there are still too many top figures who have
overstayed.

For instance, this group thinks that International Trade and Industry
Minister Datuk Seri Rafidah Aziz should pay the price for the AP
issue.

“I think most people, especially those in Umno, are expecting a major
Cabinet reshuffle. They gave him a strong mandate, so why not use it,”
said a think-tank figure.

The other school of thought insists it would be so minor that it would
not even constitute a reshuffle, that it would just be about filling
in vacancies and moving people around at levels below that of the
minister.

One obvious ministry to fill is the Federal Territories post and the
money seems to be on the current deputy moving up.

The senior faces, this group insist, will likely stay put and that
includes Rafidah because the Wanita Umno chief, warts and all, is
still unparalleled as trade minister.

This group argues that there are only about a dozen or so Cabinet
members who can be considered senior members and there is no pressing
need to replace them.

The Prime Minister really has people flummoxed about his plans.

According to another Cabinet member, the criteria that Abdullah
applies will be based on performance and function rather than pure
political considerations.

“I see him addressing the problem of over-lapping functions and
powers. He's very concerned about the efficiency of his ministries.

“I don't see him dropping any senior faces either.

“They form the senior tier and any PM needs that sort of experience
alongside newer faces in the second and third echelon,” said the
minister.

A source close to the Prime Minister's office added: “It's not about
how long they have been around but how they have performed. The PM has
been keeping tabs on their work and performance.”

Abdullah has, from the start of his administration, stressed that
party posts should not be associated with government posts and he
stuck to his conviction by retaining the three Umno ministers who lost
in the Umno supreme council contest in 2004.

He knew he was going against the tide, for the Umno ground wanted
Datuk Azmi Khalid (Home Affairs), Datuk Shafie Salleh (Higher
Education) and Datuk Paduka Kadir Sheikh Fadzir (Information) to be
replaced.

But he wanted to send a strong message against the way some Umno
politicians used whatever means to secure a party post.

Abdullah will have to grapple with this dilemma now.

Can he afford to ignore the ground feeling and retain all three or
will he try to strike a balance?

Said a top Putrajaya official: “Essentially, this Cabinet reshuffle is
about getting the right fit. It’s important that ministers really
perform in their roles otherwise it compromises efficiency and the
delivery system.

“The PM will want to put the right people in the right ministry
because that is what’s going to drive the administration in the right
direction.”

When Abdullah came to power in 2003, he had captured the national
imagination when he urged people to “work with me.”

He not only needs a Cabinet that can work with him but one which can
take his ideas and the policies of his administration to the next
level.

And that is necessary if, as political insider Annuar said, “the Prime
Minister wants to win the game when the whistle blows.”

The brilliant man of all seasons, especially if he is cabinet minister, is usually a nobody

[MGG] The brilliant man of all seasons, especially if he is cabinet minister, is usually a nobody
8 Jan 2006

THE PRIME MNISTER IS an Islamic scholar because he has a degree in
Islamic studies. But while he is a deeply religious man, as many are,
even he would admit he is no scholar. But he has been built into one
when he became prime minister. Tun Mahathir is a doctor, a great one
at that, although he stopped practicing more than 30 years ago. The
health minister, Doctor Chua Soi Lek graduated as a doctor, but gave
it up for politics about the same time. But both are described as
medical doctors. News reports, then of Tun Mahathir and Dato' Chua
now, speak of their expertise in medicine, but neither would admit to
all that. Dato' Ling Liong Sik, a medical graduate from Singapore,
gave up his medical practice about a quarter of a centry ago, but he
was treated in office as if he knew more than the specialists at the
University Hospital. Dato' Seri S. Samy Vellu, before he entered
Parliament, was known for his brawn than brain; but today in office
it is reversed.

They have beaten the odds and became what they are. They are tall
without these attributes. But in office, they are presumed to know
about everything. It is often a mockey when the Malaysian mass media
treat them as philosphers one day, teachers the next, and moralists
the day after that. It is thought, usually by officials, that people
will not believe the leader unless he is what he is not. They are
decent people, with foibles and setbacks like everyone else, but are
regarded as next to the Almighty when they reach the heights of
political office. This gives them the "right" to order their people
around and stand on their presumed dignity. But once out of office,
they are discarded by the very officials, and ignored by the people.
They are no more the cardboard figures they were in politics, even if
many of them put on airs for the rest of their lives.

This is why they cling to office. They are zeros once they leave it.
I once had lunch with a former cabinet minister, when a senior civil
servant from his former office, came across the floor to greet me. He
ignored the minister, although he had daily meetings with him only
weeks earlier when he was cabinet minister. As he left my table, I
had to call him back and introduce my host. He had already dismissed
from his mind his former minister. The man was history, and
Malaysians prefer to forget their history. Very sheepishly, he
greeted him. But it is life in Malaysia. He left the cabinet just
before Hari Raya. The previous year he had a full house in Gombak
where he stayed, of fellow cabinet ministers, ambassadors, and the
movers and shakers of the capital. But as an ex-minister, the food
went to waste. Only two people from that rarified list turned up.

Putting to pasture those who spent their life in politics, often
believing they had the attributes they are given. From one day to the
next, they experience the height of their fame and their nadir. This
is probably why there cling on to their official positions. There
are ministers in the cabinet who have been there for nearly thirty
years. But they do not have a life after they leave it. My cabinet
minister friend died a lonely death, the papers reporting it after
his burial. Another minister is on dialysis, forgotten in UMNO and
the cabinet. Those around him now do not know the power he then had.
He is a shadow of his old self, and is often lost in a crowd. There
are ministers in the cabinet who would be lost if they are dropped.
They do not have a life of their own, and being dropped is the
biggest tragedy in their lives.

Rare exceptions are Dato' Seri Anwar Ibrahim, the former deputy prime
minister who has emerged as an opposition leader after his stint in
prison, apparently on trumped up charges; Dato' Shahrir who was
sacked from the cabinet twenty years ago, but remains a credible
political figure and has built a life outside it; the late Tun
Mustapha, who became successively Yang Di Pertua and chief minister
of Sabah, and rejected Kuala Lumpur's offer of defence minister in
1974. But he had a vision, and that kept him a key figure in
Malaysian politics. There are few politicians in the National Front
who could emulate them in politics. Many wither away once out of
politics. If anything, the fight to stay in politics, especially in
the cabinet, have become stronger with the passing years. The late
Tun Sardon Jubir, said his decision to leave the cabinet was made by
an extraneous confrontation: he was told bluntly by the younger
Malays in his constituency that he should leave the cabinet and allow
them to make money, that if he had not, it was tough luck!

Pak Lah, whom I first knew as a civil servant, was not expected then
to be secretary-general of a ministry. He would have teh tariks in
Bangsar even when he was foreign minister. But that does not mean he
is a pushover. He was secretary of the National Operations Council
when the country was under civilian, or rather UMNO, "martial" law.
He was not known then for the attributes he is now said to have. But
no one in political office can be other than super human, unless he
is not from the National Front. A minister can go to Bejing and
apologize for a Malay girl, so we are told, doing nude squats, but it
is two reporters from the Chinese press who reported, like the
others, that the girl was a Chinese national. The home minister,
Dato' Azmi Khalid, is excused however although his actions allowed
China to dictate terms to Malaysia. He has denied that in Malaysia,
but he told the press there he did just that The Malaysian media
ignores what the minister said or does outside the country on a
contentious issue, and concentrates on statements in the country that
make him look good.

The spin has started to justify the resignation of the two Chinese
reporters. But It was to tell the papers owned by other than UMNO in
the National Front that they report with peril what UMNO does not
want reported, usually long after the fact. It was done so clumsily
that the deputy prime minister had to say the resignations were not
racial. But it was. The Star was taught a lesson when it was shot
down in the 1980s. When it returned after the suspension, it lost a
lot of money and its former verve in reporting. To make an
increasingly skeptical Malaysians it, a MCA deputy minister is called
in what the deputy prime minister did. The two reporters had resigned
as an offering for the paper to exist. It was this China Press that
had first reported the woman in the nude squat was a Chinese
national. The emphasis now is on the race of the woman, not the
police resorting to nude squats of women they arrest.

M.G.G.Pillai
pillai@streamyx.com

Anwar back on the Malaysian political stage

Malaysia Today
07 January 2006


Anwar back on the Malaysian political stage

SPECIAL REPORTS ARCHIVES

By John Roberts
wsws.org


Anwar Ibrahim, previously the deputy prime minister of Malaysia and
deputy president of the governing United Malays National Organisation
(UMNO), signalled his return to politics by participating in the
campaign for a by-election in the state assembly seat of Pengkalan
Pasir, held in the northern state of Kelantan on December 6.

Anwar’s foray into the campaign, on behalf of a Parti Islam se-
Malaysia (PAS) candidate who was narrowly defeated by UMNO, was his
first public political activity since his release from jail in
September 2004. He was imprisoned in 1999 after a crude frame-up
organised by his former mentor, Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad.

Mahathir and Anwar fell out in 1998 over how to respond to the Asian
economic crisis of 1997. While Mahathir sought to protect business
cronies connected to UMNO, Anwar advocated the IMF’s open market
policies. In a bitter political struggle, Mahathir imposed capital
and currency controls then sacked Anwar and expelled him and his
supporters from UMNO. When he began to campaign against the
government, Anwar was arrested, beaten and charged with sodomy and
abuse of power.

The Malaysian Federal Court belatedly overturned the sodomy charge in
September 2004 and ordered Anwar’s release from prison, but refused
to lift the corruption conviction. As a result, Anwar is ineligible
to stand for office until 2008. The court decision came after the
replacement of Mahathir as prime minister by Abdullah Ahmad Badawi in
2003.

Last August, in a further indication of Anwar’s political
rehabilitation, a court ruled that a booklet, entitled “50 Reasons
Why Anwar Cannot Be PM,” was libelous and written solely to destroy
Anwar’s career. There is a certain irony to the court decision as the
booklet, authored in early 1998 by UMNO member Jafri Khalid, was the
main source of the allegations and charges against Anwar later that
year. The libel case was settled for $US1.2 million in damages to Anwar.

In an interview in the same month with AFP, Anwar strongly hinted
that he intended to play a more visible political role by criticising
UMNO’s economic policies. He particularly condemned the government
for presiding over the large losses and scandals at major companies
such as Malaysian Airlines, auto manufacturer Proton and Bank Islam.

Anwar’s return to active political life was confirmed by his
involvement in the Kelantan by-election. He participated as an
advisor for the National Justice Party (Keadilan), which was
nominally formed by his wife, Wan Azizah Wan Ismail, while he was in
prison. Keadilan maintains a loose anti-government coalition with the
Islamic fundamentalist PAS.

Keadilan’s basic program consists of what Anwar advocated in 1998—the
greater opening up of the Malaysian economy to foreign investment and
competition. That was also the main theme of his speech to a rally of
10,000 on November 27. Anwar declared that he was “getting back the
motion” for politics. “There’s talk about strong efforts by UMNO to
prevent me,” he told the crowd. “Some cited the law, saying it would
be contempt of court. But if I’m free, I have a voice.”

Anwar accused Badawi of failing to honour his 2004 election promise
to root out corruption from Malay business. “The fact remains that
corruption is more endemic now, is more rampant.” Badawi, he
declared, “has to review the entire policy. If you continue to keep
corrupt ministers, corrupt UMNO leaders, and you go and shout about
anti-corruption, very soon we are going to be a laughing stock.”

The fact that Anwar was able to make such a speech, without legal
repercussions, is a sign that the debate over economic policy that
was behind the events of 1998 has never really been settled. There
are concerns in ruling circles that Mahathir’s currency and capital
controls, while helping to stabilise the economy, left Malaysia
lagging behind its competitors. Capital restrictions were eased under
Mahathir.

Last July, Badawi formally ended the 1998 currency controls that
pegged the Malay ringgit at 3.80 to the US dollar. The result was a
sharp increase in the flow of capital into the country. Interest
rates have also been permitted to rise for the first time in seven
years and tax incentives are being offered to investors, particularly
in the IT industry.

Sections of the business elite and foreign investors are demanding
the government go further to cut back various tariffs and regulations
that protect local companies and to crack down on official
corruption. There have also been calls for major cuts in fuel
subsidies in order to slash government spending. There is no doubt
that some sections of the ruling class, including in UMNO, see Anwar
as the political vehicle for carrying out such policies.

Significantly Anwar told journalists at a Keadilan conference on
December 22: “I have many friends in UMNO, especially at the
divisional level. They meet me to talk and discuss issues. I have
never at any time refused to meet them. In discussions with me, they
have always asked me if I could rejoin UMNO and my answer has always
been no.” While declaring the organisation had become too “corrupt”
to join, Anwar did not rule out the possibility of reentering the
ruling party if it “underwent a change”.

The return of Anwar to a leading position in UMNO is not beyond the
bounds of possibility. Under Malaysia’s autocratic form of rule,
political brawls in the ruling elite have taken similar, rather
bizarre forms before. Leading UMNO figures have been vilified,
expelled and jailed on trumped-up charges, only to be rehabilitated
and brought back onto the political stage when the need arose.

Memorandum biadab

Memorandum biadab dan bahaya, jangan ulangi lagi - 16 NGO
Friday, January 27 @ 00:00:12 MYT


"Kami bertegas, bahawa percubaan buat pertama kali Menteri-menteri bukan Islam dalam Kabinet dalam hal ini, adalah suatu tindakan yang cuba mencabar wibawa dan status undang-undang Syariah di Negara ini dengan mengguna kedudukan mereka untuk menekan Perdana Menteri. Kami melihat ini sebagai tindakan yang biadap dan sangat merbahaya."
KUALA LUMPUR, 27 Jan (Hrkh)- 16 persatuan dan kelab yang berkaitan dengan Islam dan Melayu memberikan peringatan kepada sembilan menteri bukan Islam agar jangan sekali-kali mengulangi tindakan mereka menghantar memorandum seumpama memorandum kepada Perdana Menteri sebelum ini.

Bantahan itu dibuat oleh mereka dalam satu surat yang dih! antar khas kepada kesembilan menteri berkenaan dengan salinannya dihantar kepada Perdana Menteri dan lain-lain pemimpin yang berkaitan dengan agama di negara ini.
"Kami ingin mempertegaskan bantahan kami dengan sekerasnya dan menolak sebarang percubaan mana-mana pihak termasuk dari YB Datuk dalam Kabinet untuk cuba merubah mana-mana perkara yang menyentuh kedudukan undang-undang Syariah dan institusi Mahkamah Syariah seperti yang ada dalam Perlembagaan Persekutuan," kata surat itu.
Antara yang menandatangani surat itu adalah Datuk Syeikh Azmi Ahmad, Pengerusi Institut Penyelidikan dan Pengembangan Syariah (ISRA),Datuk Dr. Maamor Mansur, Presiden Persatuan Pengguna Islam Malaysia, Syeikh Abu Bakar Awang, Yang DiPertua Persatuan Ulama Kedah, Prof Madya Salleh Ahmad,Yang di Pertua Persatuan Ulama Malaysia.
Turut menantanganinya adalah Abdul Ghani Shamsuddin, Pengerusi Sekretariat Himpunan Ulama Rantau Asia, Masadah Sajadi, Majlis Bertindak Wanita Islam Malaysia, Prof.Madya Dr. Wan Salim Mohd Nor, Yang DiPertua Persatuan Ulama Cawangan Negari Pulau Pinang serta Pengerusi WADAH Pulau Pinang.
Yang lain adalah Haji Mahfuz Omar, Pengerusi Institut Pengemblengan dan Pembangunan Komuniti (IMPAK), Hafiz Mustaffa Lubis, Angkatan Belia Islam Malaysia Kedah, Hj.Yahya Abdullah, Naib Yang di Pertua PAS Sik, Hj.Ismail Wan Teh, Pengerusi Kelab Masyarakat Perihatin Kedah, Shahrul Anuar Mahmud, AJK Persatuan Perihatin Malaysia, Mohd Asri Omar, Pengurus Pusat Pembangunan Komuniti Kedah, Awang Soluhuddin Hasyim, Setiausaha Dewan Pemuda PAS Kedah, Adam Abdul Malik, Ikatan Intelektual Nusantara dan Jaafar Daud, Kordinator TERAS Perlis.
Surat itu pula dihantar kepada Datuk Seri S. Samy Vellu (Menteri Kerja Raya), Datuk Seri Ong Ka Ting (Menteri Perumahan dan Kerajaan Tempatan) Datuk Seri Lim Keng Yek (Menteri Tenaga , Air dan Komunikasi), Datuk Seri Chan Kong Choy (Menteri Pengangkutan), atuk Seri Dr.Fong Chan Onn (Menteri Sumber Manusia),! Datuk Dr. Chua Soi Lek (Menteri Kesihatan), Datuk Dr. Maximus Ongkili (Menteri Jabatan Perdana Menteri) Datuk Peter Chin Fah Kui (Menteri Perusahaan Perladangan dan Komoditi) dan Tan Sri Bernard Dompok (Menteri Jabatan Perdana Menteri).
Walaupun isu ini dianggap sudah selesai namun mereka berpendirian bahawa para menteri itu harus meneliti kesan dari tindakan ini kerana ia telah menimbul kemarahan di kalangan masyarakat Islam di Negara ini, tulis mereka.
"Untuk itu kami ingin menegaskan pendirian kami supaya pihak YB Datuk tidak memandang ringan terhadap pandangan kami berkaitan dengan isu yang berkaitan dengan undang-undang Syariah dan kedudukan institusi agama di Negara ini," kata mereka.
Oleh kerana mereka telah bersetuju untuk menarik balik memorandum ini seperti yang dimaklumkan kepada umum, mereka mengesa para menteri ituy tidak mengulangi lagi sebarang percubaan seumpama itu dalam apa bentuk sekalipun kerana mereka akan terus memantau setiap tuntutan y! ang disuarakan yang menyentuh persoalan undang-undang Syariah.
"Kami ingin mempertegaskan bantahan kami dengan sekerasnya dan menolak sebarang percubaan mana-mana pihak termasuk dari YB Datuk dalam Kabinet untuk cuba merubah mana-mana perkara yang menyentuh kedudukan undang-undang Syariah dan institusi Mahkamah Syariah seperti yang ada dalam Perlembagaan Persekutuan.
"Kami menegaskan tidak ada sebarang sebab untuk merubah Perlembagaan Persekutuan terutama dalam hal Perkara 121 (1A). Sebarang masalah atau kes yang timbul yang melibatkan mana-mana individu tertentu hendaklah di atasi secara khusus dan tidak seharusnya Perlembagaan khususnya Perkara 121 (1A) menjadi sasaran untuk diubah.
Kami menolak dan membantah Memorandum yang diserah kepada Perdana Menteri yang ditandatangani YB Datuk baru-baru ini. Memorandum yang meminta supaya disemak semula peruntukan Perkara 121 (1A) Perlembagaan Persekutuan adalah jelas mempersoalkan kedudukan bidangkuasa Mahkamah Sy! ariah," kata mereka dalam surat itu.
Menurut surat itu, peruntukan 121 (1A) yang meletakkan Mahkamah Syariah setaraf dengan Mahkamah Sivil tidak boleh dipersoalkan kerana ia telah termaktub dalam Perlembagaan Persukutuan yang diluluskan di Parlimen.
"Kami menolak dengan keras percubaan mana-mana pihak untuk mentafsir Peruntukan itu sebagai suatu perkara yang menafikan hak orang bukan Islam. Sebarang percubaan tersebut dengan sengaja adalah suatu tindakan yang merbahaya dan mempunyai niat yang serong untuk mengelirukan pandangan awam terhadap institusi agama Islam di negara ini.
"Kami bertegas, bahawa percubaan buat pertama kali Menteri-menteri bukan Islam dalam Kabinet dalam hal ini, adalah suatu tindakan yang cuba mencabar wibawa dan status undang-undang Syariah di Negara ini dengan mengguna kedudukan mereka untuk menekan Perdana Menteri. Kami melihat ini sebagai tindakan yang biadap dan sangat merbahaya," tulis mereka dalam surat itu.
Bagi mereka, tunt! utan memorandum itu antara lain juga mahu mengubah undang-undang Syariah yang memperuntukan anak dibawah umur 18 tahun adalah Islam bila mana-mana ibu atau bapanya memeluk agama Islam.
"Kami tidak melihat tujuan lain mengenai tuntutan ini selain dari cuba mengubahsuai undang-undang Syariah mengikut kehendak mereka.
"Kami membantah keras percubaan untuk mengubah undang undang Syariah yang dikatakan bercanggah dengan undang-undang sivil. Sesungguhnnya tuntutan ini mempunyai niat serong untuk memburukkan imej undang-undang Syariah dan mahu meletakkan undang-undang sivil lebih tinggi dari undang-undang Syariah," kata mereka.
Bagi persatuan-persatuan itu, mereka tidak nampak tujuan lain Memorandum ini selain dari keinginan para menteri itu untuk akhirnya meletakkan undang-undang Syariah tidak campurtangan dalam urusan kehidupan awam dan ia menjadi undang-undang yang berada dibawah undang-undang sivil.
"Ini tidak akan dapat kami terima samasekali," kata sur! at itu.
Sehubungan itu, mereka mengesa supaya para menteri ini jangan mengguna kedudukan masing-masing untuk kepentingan politik sempit dan cuba mengambil kesempatan dari kes-kes tertentu untuk menekan Perdana Menteri atau kerajaan supaya memenuhi tuntutan.
"Kami ingin mengingatkan bahawa sebarang percubaan untuk meneruskan usaha yang akan mencabar atau mempersoalkan kedudukan dan status undang-undang Syariah serta sebarang Institusi agama di Negara ini akan mencetuskan penentangan yang meluas dari orang Islam dan kesan selanjutnya akan menjadi sangat berat," kata mereka.
Dalam surat itu juga, mereka menggesa para menteri itu meminta maaf secara terbuka kepada masyarakat Islam di negara ini dan mereka menunggu maklumbalas dari para menteri itu.
-ZS

Metramac: Should Halim refund or govt sue Daim for RM32.5 million?

The Sun, Kuala Lumpur
25 January 2006


Should Halim refund or govt sue Daim for RM32.5 million?

More light has been thrown in the decade-and-a-half-old RM756 million
Metramac concession scandal since the Court of Appeal judgment by
Justice Datuk Gopal Sri Ram that Halim Saad and Anuar Othman “had
flirted with an aggravated form of criminal breach of trust, an
offence carrying a maximum 20-year jail term with whipping and fine
upon conviction”, involving misappropriation of RM32.5 million from
the Cheras toll concessionaire.

In a letter to The Sun, Muhamad Fawzi Abdul Karim, the Project
Advisor and brother of Datuk Fawziah Abdul Karim, the then director
of Syarikat Teratai KG Sdn Bhd, a family company (now known as
Metramac Corporation Sdn Bhd) who primarily assisted his sister in
the affairs of STKG until 1990, sought to put certain facts stated in
Halim’s earlier statement in proper perspective.

Muhamad Fawzi contended that there was “absolutely no justification
for public funds to be used to pay RM32.5m to Metramac or Metro
Juara, which are companies controlled by Halim for his private
investment.”

He said Halim in his press statement did not produce the entire
content of the letter dated Feb 13, 1992, from the Ministry of Works.
The relevant part of the letter which is not reproduced sets out the
condition for the payment of the RM32.5 million.

The paragraph is as follows:

“Walaubagaimanapun pembayaran tersebut akan hanya dibuat selepas tuan
mendapatkan persetujuan bertulis daripada peminjam-peminjam tuan
membatalkan perjanjian konsensi asal serta segala hak-hak dan
tuntutan di bawah perjanjian itu pada atau sebelum 31.3.1992.”

Muhamad Fawzi said:

When this letter is examined in full, it will be seen that the note
in the audited accounts of Metramac for the financial year 1992 as
referred to by Halim in his press statement is incorrect.

The notes to Metramac’s Accounts for the year ended March 31, 1992
stated that:

“The Government of Malaysia has agreed (via their letter dated Feb
13, 1992) and has paid an amount of RM32.5 million to the Concession
Company on the condition that the Concession Company pay the premium
to the shareholders of the Company.”

This is not found in the letter dated Feb 13, 1992, from the Ministry
of Works.

An appeal to the Federal Court has been filed by Metramac Corp.Sdn.
Bhd.against the Court of Appeal judgment in favour of Fawziah
Holdings Sdn. Bhd and I do not want to prejudge its outcome.

Without getting involved in the dispute between the two parties in
the appeal case before the Federal Court, there is the public
interest question that must be asked – whether the RM32.5 million was
properly paid out by the Treasury, and if not, whether Halim Saad
should refund the RM32.5 million to treasury or whether the
government should sue for reparations from the Finance Minister at
the time responsible for this payment, Tun Daim Zainuddin for
wrongful disbursement of RM32.5 million?

The Finance Minister, Datuk Seri Abdullah Ahmad Badawi should
publicly declare the government’s stand on this extraordinary and
most improper RM32.5 million payment out of the public coffers ending
up in the hands of two individuals, Halim Saad and Anuar Othman.

UK Muslim Scholar Zaki Badawi Dies

UK Muslim Scholar Zaki Badawi Dies


Additional Reporting by Khaled Mamdouh, IOL Staff

LONDON, January 24, 2006 (IslamOnline.net & News Agencies) – Renowned British Muslim scholar and Principal of the Muslim College in London, Dr. Zaki Badawi, passed away Tuesday, January 24.

It is with great sorrow that we announce the passing away of Dr Zaki Badawi, Principal of the Muslim College, this morning, London-based Muslim News Web site declared Tuesday.

"Dr Badawi was a great scholar of Islam and has made a huge contribution to the Muslim community, and his demise will be a great loss to all the communities. His devotion to interfaith dialogue was unparalleled," Editor of The Muslim News, Ahmed J Versi, was quoted as saying on the Web site.

Versi told IOL over the phone that he was informed by a friend about the sad news and the Muslim College confirmed their Principal breathed his last at 11:00 a.m. London Time.

Versi added, citing sources at the Muslim College, that the late Badawi would be buried Wednesday or Thursday.

Sources in London told IOL that Badawi was on his way to deliver a lecture this morning when he suddenly felt ill and was hastily taken to hospital where he died.

Influential


"We are deeply shocked and saddened by his sudden demise," Sacranie said.


For decades Dr Badawi, 83, was a leading reformist figure, calling for the Mu! slim minority to engage fully with British life, according to the BBC News Online that dubbed him "One of the UK's most influential Muslim" scholars.

Egyptian-born Dr Badawi founded the Muslim College in London, according to the BBC.

Chief Rabbi Sir Jonathan Sacks was! among the first to offer his condolences, saying Dr Badawi was the "face and voice of Islamic dignity and tolerance", the BBC reported.

"He was a man of conscience and courage and I cherished his friendship," Sir Jonathan added to the British Broadcaster.

Versi told the BBC that Badawi's death was a "loss to all communities".

"Dr Badawi was a great scholar of Islam and has made a huge contribution to the Muslim community. His devotion to interfaith dialogue was unparalleled."

In the aftermath of the July 7 London bombings, Badawi was consulted by government on how best to tackle extremism, the BBC said.

A statement from the Muslim Council of Britain (MCB) mourned the loss of Badawi, saying they were "shocked and saddened" by Badawi's death.

"We are deeply shocked and saddened by his sudden demise. Dr Badawi’s passing constitutes a major loss for British Muslims. We pray that God Almighty grants him a place in His paradise with the martyrs, the prophets and the righteous," Sir Iqbal Sacranie, Secretary-General of the MCB, was quoted as saying on the MCB Web site.

Background

Badawi, scholar, teacher and community activist, was born in Egypt in 1922. He was renowned for his interest in Islamic theology and law and as a representative and advocate of Muslims in Britain.

He was the principal of the Muslim College in London, which he founded in 1986, and frequently published and broadcast on Islamic affairs.

Badawi was educated at Al-Azhar University in Cairo. He obtained al-Aliyah, the equivalent of a Bachelor of Arts degree, from the College of Theology at the university, and Al-Alimiyah degree (Masters) from the Faculty of Arabic Language and Literature, Al-Azhar, in 1947.

In the same year, he received the King Faruq First Prize for the best post-graduate student.

After teaching at Al-Azhar for a short while, he moved to the United Kingdom in 1951 to study psychology at University College London. In 1954, he obtained his Bachelors degree. Badawi continued his studies and was awarded a doctorate from London University in Modern Muslim Thought.

Shortly after obtaining his PhD, he returned to Al-Azhar University and taught Muslim Thought and Scientific Research Methods.

He was then sent as a representative of the university to Malaya to establish a Muslim College there. After teaching Arabic and Islamic Studies at the University of Malaya in Singapore, he lectured in the same course at the University of Malaya in Kuala Lumpur.

In 1964, he was appointed Professor of Islamic Education at Ahmadu Bello University in Northern Nigeria and later Professor of Islamic Education and Dean of Arts at Bayero College, Nigeria. In 1976, he was appointed research professor at the Hajj Research Center of King Abdul Aziz University in Saudi Arabia stationed in London.

In 1978, and still in the United Kingdom, Badawi was appointed director of the Islamic Cultural Center (ICC) and Chief Imam of London Central Mosque in Regents Park.

During his time at the ICC, Badawi was instrumental in establishing the Sharia`h (Islamic Law) Council as a facility to reconcile conflicts between Islamic law and the British civil code.

Badawi was elected chairman of the Imams and Mosques Council by the National Conference of Imams and Mosque Officials of the UK in 1984. He held this position until his death.

Badawi established the Muslim College in London in 1986. By 1989, and with Badawi as its principal, the college realized its founding objective as a postgraduate seminary for t! he training of imams and Muslim leaders in the West.

Understanding Article 121(A) of the Constitution and the Jurisdiction of the Civil and Shari’ah Courts

Understanding Article 121(A) of the Constitution and the Jurisdiction of the Civil and Shari’ah Courts

1. In 1957, the Reid Commission assumed it unimportant. But Article 145 states that the Attorney General does not have powers over the Shari’ah court. Schedule 9 mentions the Shari’ah court.

2. The constitution is the basis of the nation; it! has historical and political foundations.

3. Islam was the law of the land in the beginning before colonisation. It must be remembered and emphasised that the shari’ah courts existed before the Constitution was drafted.

4. In 1965, the Shari’ah Courts Act states in detail the jurisdiction and limits of the Shari’ah court.

5. In 1988, article ! 121(A) was amended after years of demands, seminars and resolutions. This amendment reaffirms its clear separation without doubt. It ensures no encroachment of civil court judges into shari’ah matters.

6. In 1982, the Chief Justice stated that the Civil Court must respect the eminence of the shari’ah jurists in shari’ah matters. The 1988 amendment only reaffirms this.

7. In 1992, a SCJ stated that serious shari’ah issues need consideration by eminent jurists who are properly qualified in the field of Islamic jurisprudence. It is imperative that the determination on the issues requires substantial consideration of the Islamic law by relevant jurists qualified to do so. The only forum qualified to do so is the Shari’ah Court.

8. Subsequent cases show that the expression “the jurisdiction of the Shari’ah courts” refer to either (a) matters expressly provided in legislation on Islam (e.g. conversion), or (b) matters which can be implied from legislation on Islam (e.g. apostasy).

9. Neither the Civil nor the Shari’ah courts have power over each other nor is any of them higher than the other.

10. Any move to change this amendment will have grave effects on the justice system, political and other essential issues.

11. The current issue is really a need for Non-Muslims in seeking legal redress. It needs the study of legal avenues to establish that Islam is just. It is not a constitutional matter.

12. The current administration has to be improved to ensure that the system is just.

13. Every citizen needs to know and understand the constitution, the foundation of the nation in order to avoid confusion.

Malaysia's web of politics and business

Asia Times Online
25 January 2006


Southeast Asia


Malaysia's web of politics and business
By Anil Netto

PENANG, Malaysia - When Mahathir Mohamad stepped down as prime
minister in 2003, one analyst predicted the period of veneration of
his role and legacy in transforming Malaysia would soon give way to a
process of "de-Mahathirizing" Malaysia.

Sure enough, his legacy is being re-evaluated as the warts begin to
show. The flip side of his rule is not a pretty picture: bailouts,
financial scandals, questionable deals and unviable projects, some of
which are only now coming to light.

One day, it is state-controlled car maker Proton, which has been
losing local market share, its strategic alliance with Volkswagen
scrapped before it could even take off.

Another day, it is Malaysia Airlines, saddled with huge losses
despite previously being bailed out by the government. Then there's
the bad-loans scandal in Bank Islam that forced a management change.

Also, the multibillion-ringgit Bakun Dam project in Sarawak state has
been much delayed and is now expected to generate electricity only in
late 2009. Even then, without the planned submarine cables to channel
electricity to the more industrialized peninsula, the economic
justification for the dam will have disappeared.

On Monday came news that the multimillion-ringgit Entertainment
Village project, Malaysia's answer to Hollywood and located within
the Multimedia Super Corridor (MSC), has been abandoned. Officials
say it won't affect the MSC's ambitions to promote software and other
multimedia development, but it is obvious that the corridor, another
Mahathir brainchild, is no longer ahead in the regional stakes.

Last week, a senior judge's remarks on the dispute surrounding the
takeover of a toll concession firm in 1990 brought back memories of
the close business-political nexus of the Mahathir years. Court of
Appeal Judge Gopal Sri Ram ruled that two businessmen, Anuar Othman
and Halim Saad, in the early 1990s had siphoned off RM32 million (US
$8.5 million) from a highway toll concession firm, Metramac Corp Sdn
Bhd (formerly Syarikat Teratai KG Sdn Bhd or STKG).

STKG's earning potential was abruptly halted by a public
demonstration against toll collection at the Cheras Highway in
September 1990. The government stepped in and suspended toll
collection, a move that spelled disaster for the company.

STKG put forward a claim for RM764.2 million in compensation. But
"its appeal to then-minister of finance Tun Daim Zainuddin fell on
deaf ears. He simply told the defendant's then existing shareholders
that the federal government was not in a position to pay the
defendant any compensation," observed Sri Ram.

But curiously in November 1990, a politically linked listed company,
UEM Bhd, offered to buy STKG's shares for RM97 million - though in
reality the shares were to be acquired by a UEM-nominated firm, Metro
Juara Sdn Bhd, owned by Anuar and Halim. The takeover was completed
in January 1990.

Why pay RM97 million for the shares of a company in dire straits?
asked the judge. "The answer is simple enough. Anuar Othman and Dato
Halim Saad had something which the plaintiff did not. And that was
the patronage of the then-minister of finance, Tun Daim Zainuddin.

"All the independent evidence on record points to this being in
reality a crude case of economic duress presenting itself in a more
subtle form."

After the takeover, "as if by the rub of a magic lamp, the federal
government and DBKL [Kuala Lumpur City Hall], who hitherto claimed to
be impoverished, suddenly found themselves flush with funds". The
judge said the compensation figures were staggering. "In one way or
another the defendant was to receive a total sum of RM756 million."
This amount, the judge said, included RM312 million for work already
done, RM405 million to enable Metramac to meet the cost of financing
work to be done under a new agreement and RM32.5 million as "payment
for share premium" not "previously taken into account".

Halim, who was not a party in the case, responded angrily in the
media. "My company was ordered by the government to take over
Metramac as the issue of the toll collection at Cheras had become so
political and tense. There was in fact a near-riot."

He said his firm, Metro Juara, was asked to buy Metramac shares at
market value plus a "premium" of RM32.5 million. "My personal opinion
then was that the RM32.5 million was not payable to the previous
shareholders. But the government asked us to pay that amount and we
could only manage a silent protest," he said.

"This was the same RM32.5 million that the ministry decided to
reimburse me and Dato' Anuar Othman in Metro Juara through Metramac
as stated in the letter of 13th February 1992."

He pointed out that Tun Daim Zainuddin resigned as finance minister
in March 1991, and the new agreements were signed in February and
March 1992 when Anwar Ibrahim was finance minister.

Daim, who is abroad, issued a brief statement through his lawyers,
describing the judge's findings as "erroneous". He is expected to
issue a detailed response in the next few days.

Anwar, for his part, said the matter was a done deal by the time he
took over as finance minister and urged the attorney general to
launch an immediate investigation.

Many were encouraged that the judiciary felt bold enough to speak out
against such prominent personalities, though largely linked to the
previous administration. While civil-society groups lauded the
judge's remarks, Mahathir has been largely silent. Anuar and Halim
were proteges of Mahathir's long-serving economic czar, Daim
Zainuddin, and were closely linked to companies related to the ruling
United Malays National Organization (UMNO).

In a 1992 study of corporate stock ownership, it was revealed that
Halim and his wife Noraini collectively owned almost RM2.4 billion
worth of corporate stock. Anuar Othman, for his part, had publicly
announced that he was acting as UMNO's business proxy, according to a
book authored by economists Edmund Terence Gomez and K S Jomo.

In another case this week, Court of Appeal judges slammed the
Insolvency Department of Malaysia for delays in bankruptcy cases.

So is Malaysia's judiciary waking up from its slumber? The judiciary
itself was a victim of Mahathir's authoritarian rule from 1981 to
2003. In 1988, Mahathir clamped down on the judiciary ahead of a
crucial case involving the ruling party. The lord president and five
top judges were suspended. In a psychological blow, the Supreme Court
was renamed the Federal Court, while the lord president's position
was labeled "chief justice".

Far-reaching constitutional amendments, passed in 1988 at a time when
a string of vocal opposition parliamentarians were under detention
without trial, curbed the powers of the judiciary. Sharia courts were
raised to the level of civil courts and given powers to decide on
cases touching on Islam. It was hard then to foresee how much this
would strain inter-religious ties and the social compact among
Malaysians.

Many now feel that civil judges, interpreting the amendments
cautiously, have surrendered too much ground to the sharia courts,
leaving non-Muslims without a remedy in certain types of cases, such
as those involving religious conversion and child custody cases.
What's more, Mahathir's pronouncement in 2001 that Malaysia was
already an Islamic country/state threw the very nature of the
Malaysian nation state into doubt.

These developments have cast a shadow on Mahathir's legacy and Prime
Minister Abdullah Badawi could well profit from it by isolating the
old guard and the Mahathir loyalists within his administration. Not
that Abdullah has no controversies of his own to deal with -
especially over the role played by his fast-rising and ambitious son-
in-law, Khairy Jamaluddin.

"There's been a bit of a ground shift,'' said one Kuala Lumpur-based
political commentator. "This is the year of the disclosure of the
shenanigans under Mahathir."

The ruling UMNO will be in for a very big factional fight next year,
when party polls are due to be held, he predicted.

"Abdullah Badawi has a bit more subtlety than you and I give him
credit for," he said. "He will move to cut the ground under the feet
of the corrupt." But he warned that the forces against reform remain
formidable and entrenched. The Metramac judgment was issued on
January 12, but government agencies appear in no hurry to probe
deeper, despite a clamor from civil society groups and opposition
politicians.

So have things really changed? It won't be easy to untangle the
intricate web of politics and business in Malaysia, so intertwined
are the two in this country. Whether Abdullah has the political will
or stomach to match his rhetoric with substantive reforms remains to
be seen.

Anil Netto is a freelance writer based in Penang, Malaysia.

Al-Ikhwan Al-Muslimeen: the Muslim Brotherhood

Al-Ikhwan Al-Muslimeen: the Muslim Brotherhood




Military Review Washington
Saturday, November 12, 2005
Al-Ikhwan Al-Muslimeen: the Muslim Brotherhood
Military Review, by Youssef H. Aboul-Enein

Save a personal copy of this article and quickly find it again with Furl.net. It's free! Save it.
WITHOUT CLOSELY examining Al-Ikhwan al-Muslimeen (the Muslim Brotherhood) founded in Egypt in 1928, it is impossible to try to understand modern Islamic radicalism. Al-Ikhwan was the first of its kind to politicize Islam within the context of the colonial age and the first to put into practice the theories of Salafist thinkers such as Jamal-al-Din al-Afghani and Muhammad Abduh. These two Muslim revivalists, who wrote and preached during the beginning of the 20th-century, espoused that Islam and modernity are compatible and that Muslims lack control over their destinies because they have fallen into fatalism, abandoning the quest for understanding. According to Al-Afghani and Abduh, falling away from their true faith has made Muslim lands vulnerable to Western colonialism.

From the Muslim Brotherhood ranks came Sayed Qutb, who wrote the jihadist pamphlet Ma'alim (Guideposts), and many members of the more militant Gammaa al-Islamiya (The Islamic Group) and Al-Jihad as well as Al-Takfir wal-Hijra (Excommunication and Migration). Most leaders of these militant organizations and their members were once members of the Brotherhood. The history of the Brotherhood is intertwined with the events surrounding Egypt's 1952 founding as a Republic.

Al-Ikhwan members once included the late Mohammed Atef, Osama bin-Laden's military commander, and Ayman al-Zawahiri, Al-Qaeda's political ideologue. The question for those studying Islamic terrorism is, "To what extent did the Muslim Brotherhood influence the suicide bomber Muhammad Atta and the blind cleric Shiekh Omar Abd-al-Rahman?"



Understanding Hasasan-Al-Banna's Egypt

Hassan-Al-Banna, born in 1906 in the delta town of Mahmudiya, saw an Egypt completely dominated by England. By 1919 he was participating in nationalist protests. He and his family witnessed nationalist leader Saad Zaghloul calling for the withdrawal of the British and the granting of independence to Egypt. British high commissioners in Cairo, including the distinguished commissioner Lord Horatio Kitchener, had governed the country since 1882. Despite being granted independence in 1922, Egypt retained a de facto British high commissioner, who continued to dictate policy to King Fouad and his son King Farouk. England continued to treat Egyptians with contempt, using such racial epithets as "gyppos" and "camel jockey," words that originated with British and Australian troops serving touts of duty in Egypt. Egyptians have typically been weaned on stories of English domination, some real, others exaggerated. One such story is about an English hunter shooting pigeons on an Egyptian farmer's property. The farmer, seeing the birds he raised for food being killed, tried to persuade the hunter to stop. The hunter refused to acknowledge the farmer, so the farmer struck the Englishman, killing him. In relaliation, British troops razed the village, causing many deaths and casualties. Today, this town is called Damanhour (Flowing Blood) in commemoration.

Al-Banna's childhood education consisted of an Islamic elementary education and learning watch repair, his father's craft. His father, a graduate of Al-Azhar University, was the village's Islamic leader. At the age of 12, Al-Banna was enrolled in primary school and began his association with Islamic groups. He also became a member of the Society for Islamic Morality, whose members were to adhere to a strict code of Muslim behavior, with frees imposed on those who cursed, drank, or smoked. This evangelism expanded to include a membership in the Society for Preventing the Forbidden. At 16, Al-Banna attended Dar-al-Ulum, an Islamic teacher's training college in Cairo where he focused his studies on Tawheed (theology), Fiqh (jurisprudence), Arabic literature, and Kalam (modem Islamic ideology or theosophy). The Hasafiya Order of Sufism also attracted Al-Banna because of its strict observance of scripture, rituals, and ceremonies. He found a sense of cause and importance in joining the order, and he became its secretary, handling charitable social needs. However, his activities were limited to upholding Islamic standards and imposing them on others.

During his 5 years in Cairo, Al-Banna saw Egypt's secular culture as immoral, decadent, and atheistic. He was alarmed also by the reforms of Kemal Attaturk, who abolished the Caliphate. Al-Banna worried that the 1925 establishment of secular Egyptian universities was the first step toward a Turkish-style abandonment of Islam. (1)

Al-Banna, finding like-minded men at his school and other universities, came under the influence of Sheikh Al-Dwijiri, who argued that Al-Azhar clerics were not capable of stemming the tide of Western influence. This idea was not new; it reflected the writings of Muhammad Abduh, saying that the Al-Azhar clergy were corrupt agents of the government and that any cleric who helped maintain colonial rule was to be considered illegitimate. The most influential person in Al-Banna's life, however, was Sheikh Muhibb al-Din Khatib, a Syrian reformer who ran the Salafiya Library and helped found the Young Muslim Men's Association. From Khatib, Al-Banna learned elements of organizing the masses and mobilizing disaffected youth. (2) Al-Banna graduated from Dar-al-Ulum in 1927 and proceeded to teach at a post in the port city of Ismailiah.

Al-Banna and the Muslim Brotherhood

In Ismailiah, a town on the Suez Canal, Al-Banna's influences caught up with him as he witnessed the exploitation of Egyptian workers by foreigners who ran the Suez Canal Company. In response. Al-Banna and his colleagues founded Al-Ikhwan al-Muslimeen. He declared that Egyptian poverty, powerlessness, and lack of dignity resulted from failing to adhere to Islam and adopting Western values and culture. "Islam hooah al-hal" (Islam is the solution to all Egyptian and mankind's ills), a buzzword still uttered today, represents a frustration with socialism, capitalism, and a democracy manipulated to favor the ruling party.

The first 10 years of Al-Ikhwan activities focused on recruiting and establishing branches throughout Egypt. Al-Banna called for a constitution derived from the Quran and Sunnah, as well as the precedents set forth by the first four rightly-guided Caliphs. He wanted the abrogation of secular law and the introduction of Islamic law as the law of Egypt. Another aspect of Al-Banna's message was the prohibition of vices such as gambling, prostitution, usury, monopolies, books, and songs, as well as ideas not conforming to Islamic law. Although Al-Banna preached pan-Islamism, he was not opposed to pan-Arabism and Egyptian nationalism. In his pamphlet Diary of Dawa and Dai'iah, Al-Banna clearly outlines the early years of the organization saying, "I prefer to gather men than gather information from books." (3) He emphasized building the Ikhwanic organization and established internal rules to keep it going beyond his lifetime. (4)

Al-Ikhwan under Kings Fouad and Farouk

In 1936, Al-Banna sent a letter to King Farouk and Prime Minister Nahas Pasha encouraging them to promote an Islamic order. That same year Egypt signed the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty, giving more control and autonomy to local governments. By 1938 Al-Banna called on King Farouk to dissolve Egypt's political parties because of their corruption and the division they caused within the country. (5) The Brotherhood's tactics began to change from working within the system to advocating an armed revolutionary struggle to facilitate change. (6) Today, the debate on whether Islamists should work within the system or propagate violence continues within Ikhwan ranks, a debate that has led to the creation of such splinter groups as Gamaa al-Islamiya and Tanzeem al-Jihad.

As early as 1940, guerrilla training camps were established in the Mukatam Hills that overlook Cairo as well as in areas in southern Egypt, with members of the Egyptian officer corps (some affiliated with Nasser's Free Officers' Movement) providing training. So organized was the Brotherhood's militant wing that during the 1948 Arab-Israeli War there was an increase in the types of weapons in its arsenal. That same year several thousand Ikhwan members fought in the Arab-Israeli conflict, increasing the organization's stature and recruiting ability and further cementing its relation ship with the Egyptian Army.

When the Brotherhood began, it included political, educational, and social arms. The organization added a militant arm during World War II and established an Ikhwan quasi-judiciary that issued fatwas against those who were judged to have betrayed faith and country. Once the judiciary arm condemned a person, the Brotherhood's militant arm carried out the sentence. Brotherhood activities also included the 1948 bombing of the Circurrel Shopping Complex and the assassinations of internal security officials, Judge Ahmed Al-Khizindaar, and Prime Minister Noqrashi Pasha. In retaliation, King Farouk's internal security apparatus assassinated Al-Banna in 1949, but the Brotherhood endured and has since become intertwined in Egyptian domestic politics.

Ikwan under Nasser

Anwar Sadat played a pivotal role in bringing together the Brotherhood and members of the Free Officers' Association. As early as 1946, he saw that the two groups had common aims (the overthrow of the monarchy blamed for the military failure in Palestine) and that the recruitment of officers and infiltration of troops was redundant and often divisive.

When Nasser finally met Al-Banna in 1948, Nasser convinced Al-Banna that gaming a wide base of support among the military through his Free Officers and uniting secular and Muslim officers under the banner of Egyptian self-rule would be more constructive and lead to a quicker revolution than a purely Islamist one. Once liberated, Egypt could determine the best way to govern the country. (7)

Nasser succeeded in overthrowing the monarchy in July 1952 and, with the help of the Muslim Brotherhood, hoped to steer a course toward an Islamic government. But the Brotherhood was rebuffed when Nasser offered it only a ministerial post in the Awqaf (religious endowments) and an appointment to the post of Mufti of Egypt. A deterioration of the relationship between Nasser and the Ikhwan ensued. Nasser's decision to set aside the Brotherhood had much to do with the Coptic Christian and Muslim secular members of his Free Officers' Association who did not espouse Al-Banna's vision of an Islamic Egypt. (8) Perhaps surprisingly, the Ikhwan talked directly with the British Embassy in an effort to find common ground in destabilizing Nasser's regime, which both France and England saw as being hostile toward them.

During Nasser's regime, many Brotherhood members were driven underground, and thousands were jailed. Ikhwan writings show that the level of its persecution under Nasser was greater than what they endured during the monarchy. Qutb, influenced by Al-Banna, wrote Guideposts during Nasser's reign and formulated his ideas for militant Islam in the jail cells of Nasser's Egypt. Another side-effect of Nasser's crack-down of the Ikhwan involved the dispersal of members to neighboring Arab countries like Saudi Arabia. It was during this time that the strict Wahabi strain of Islam was infused into Ikhwan ideology.

Sayed Qutb's Guideposts argues that leaders should be accepted not merely because they are Muslim. They must be selected by the Ummah, and the selected leader must be just, void of corruption, and not an oppressor. Qutb saw Nasser's experimentation with socialism as leading the nation toward heresy. Qutb was executed on the gallows of Tura Prison in 1966. (9)

Like Al-Banna, Qutb's message left an important legacy for militant groups. Muhammad Faraj, another member who split off to become a founding ideologue of Gamaa al-Islamiyah, was, like Qutb, influenced by repression and corruption. In 1982 Faraj published Al-Farida al-Ghaiba (The Missing Obligation), referring to Jihad. Faraj writes that abandoning the holy war led Muslims to their plight. He characterized Hosni Mubarak's government as a neo-colonialist regime that had rejected as futile Ikhwan's efforts to work with the regime.

Relations between the Ikhwan and Egypt's regimes have been rocky, ranging from Nasser's suppression to Sadat's liberalism before Camp David but suppression after and finally, to complete suppression under Mubarak. The Ikhwan have also been influenced by Arab Afghans and have been a militant political voice of Islam in Egypt. Gamaa al-Islamiyah (The Islamic Group), established in 1979, and Al-Jihad loosely pursued the organization's militant agenda. To say the three are firmly connected would be an overstatement; they operate individually and collaborate occasionally when the political opportunity warrants.

Ikhwan Ideologies

The Ikhwan, which has successfully infiltrated elements of the Egyptian Army and police, has also been successful in controlling lawyers', pharmacists', engineers', and doctors' unions in Egypt. The organization also recruits technical university specialists, which has been made easier by Mubarak's complete suppression of any political expression in the universities. In the 1950s and 1960s there were a variety of student unions that have disappeared under Mubarak's regime. Students are turning to the Brotherhood to express their discontent with government policies and the economy. (10) In The Messages of Imam-ul-Shaheed Hassan Al-Banna, Al-Banna characterizes the Ikhwan by highlighting the following principles that unite organizations modeled on the original Egyptian version: (11)

* Following the Salaf, a complete rejection of any action or principle that contradicts the Sunnah and Quran.

* Striving to implement the Sunnah in every aspect of public life. The Egyptian court system has been used successfully to bring suit against intellectuals and writers deemed heretics. The most famous case was that of Abu Ziad, an Islamic scholar, who was declared an apostate by the Court of Cassations. He was forced to divorce his wife and after repeated threats, he fled to the Netherlands. A climate created by the Ikhwan may have stimulated another tragedy, the 1994 stabbing death of Egyptian Noble Laureate Naguib Mahfouz.

* Increasing Iman (religiosity) by focusing on the purity of hearts.

* Working toward Islamizing the government and assisting in this goal outside the borders of Egypt within the Islamic world.

* Forming sports clubs and commiting members to a life of physical fitness.

* Enhancing the knowledge of Islam and the Shariah among Egyptians and others.

* Establishing a sound economic infrastructure through contributions of its members to sponsor Islamic schools, healthcare, and other projects.

* Fostering links with other Ikhwan within the Islamic world and beyond. (12)

These principles have found their way into the dialogues of modern leaders like Omar al-Telmessany, who ran the organization during Sadat's reign as well as into their newspaper Al-Dawa (The Call).

Objectives

Introduction to the Dawa of the Ikhwan al-Muslimoon outlines the organization's main objectives. It begins with the self and ends with a united Islamist world in their image by advocating--

* Building the Muslim individual. Building an organized person, strong in body and mind, able to earn a living, correct in worship, and possessing a self-struggling character.

* Building the Muslim family. Choosing a proper spouse, educating children Islamically, and building a community network of family support groups.

* Building a Muslim society. Creating a society starting with individuals and families and addressing the problems of society honestly, realistically, and through open debate.

* Building a Muslim State. The Ikhwan publicly espouses that preparing a society for an Islamic government should be the first step toward Islamization. This means spreading Islamic culture, ideals, and policy through media, the mosque, and charitable works as well as through soliciting membership from public organizations like unions, syndicates, and student unions. This dogma is found in Ahmed Ar-Rasheed's, The Path. (13)

* Building the Caliphate. This means building a united Islamic world.

* Mastering the world of Islam. Muslims should control their own destiny within Dar-ul-Islam (The Abode of Islam).

Methods of Education (Tarbiah)

Once a person becomes an Ikhwan member he participates in weekly study units known as Halaqas. There are also monthly Katibah in which several Halaqas from various enclaves and villages meet to discuss political and religious affairs. There are also trips, camps, courses of study, Islamic workshops, and conferences that Ikhwan sponsors throughout Egypt and the Islamic world. Each member is given a schedule with established goals to complete that require the endorsement of key leaders. This description can be found in Ali Abd-al-Haleem's, Means of Education of the Ikhwan al-Muslimoon. (14)

As careful study shows, the Ikhwan have articulated goals, which resonate among Egyptian lower and middle-class societies. In addition, the education system is organized with the dual purpose of mass mobilization and control, much like a military unit.

In the realm of counterterrorism, there is much to be gained by careful analysis of the Ikhwan. For example, looking at the 10 principles of Al-Banna, number three states, "Assume first that you are wrong, not your Muslim Brother, and see how you find the truth impartially." (15) The 10th principle states, "Have sympathy for those who do not see the light; rather than being angry or expose their shortcomings, I never attacked my accusers or detractors personally, but rather sought God's help in making His message clearer to those listening." (16) Such phrases contradict Al-Banna's actions during the violent phase initiated in the 1940s. Armed with this information one can begin to isolate and delegitimize groups willing to work within Al-Banna's peaceful call and those wanting to resort to violence.

Sadly, the organization's current theme has been radicalized by Egyptian Ikhwan contact with Saudi radicals and is expressed in the last two of the five key phrases of the organization's pledge:

* Allah is our objective.

* The messenger is our leader.

* Quran is our law.

* Dying in the way of God is our highest hope.

* Jihad is our way. (17)

This was never part of Al-Banna's message. The counterterrorism challenge will be to foster the original message of working toward peaceful change as well as encouraging and acknowledging the social service provided to poor Egyptians. Integrating the elements that work with the government and its political system should be part of an aggressive counterterrorism strategy. There is blanket persecution of all Islamists by the Egyptian authorities, without truly delineating between violent militants and fundamentalists. Exploiting the ideological differences between those who want to express themselves politically through violence and others through peaceful means can be used to undermine those really dangerous militants.

Egyptian democracy is eroding. Even as Mubarak tries to stem the challenge of the Muslim Brotherhood, the Ikhwan continues to dominate the lawyers', doctors', pharmacists', engineers', and journalists' unions known as niqabat. The government has stepped in to change the rules, which allowed Islamists to be legally elected into positions of authority. Law 93 of 1995, which would have allowed Egyptian authorities the right to arrest anyone publishing false news, was issued and then withdrawn. The journalist syndicate threatened a shut down and Mubarak bowed to public pressure. In 1995, the Mubarak regime manipulated the general elections for assembly seats by changing the wording of the election laws that resulted in mass arrests on the eve of the election. This undermined Muslim fundamentalists wanting to work within the system and empowered jihadists calling for a violent overthrow. (18)

The Muslim Brotherhood, inadvertently through dissent within its own ranks, spawned several militant groups. Group splits occurred as early as 1939 with the creation of the "Youth of Our Lord Muhammad Group," which denounced Al-Banna for his compromises with the Egyptian monarchy. In 1973, students aligned with the Brotherhood created Gamaa al-Islamiyah, which gained popularity on college campuses, but was suppressed by the government of Anwar Sadat. (19) Today, this group's militant and social affairs function is to bring an Islamic government to Egypt. By providing technical guidance through its philosophies and techniques, the Brotherhood has been a source of inspiration to other Islamic militants in the Arab and Muslim world, which makes it an organization worth tracking. Its history is one of sedition and violence.

NOTES

(1.) Arabic material cited in this essay represents LCDR Aboul-Enein's translations and understanding of the material; David Commins, "Hassan Al-Banna (1906-1949)," in Pioneers of Islamic Revival, ed. Ali Rahnema (London: Zed Books, 1994), 131-33.

(2.) Ibid.

(3.) Muslim Brotherhood Movement homepage, on-line at , accessed 14 April 2001.

(4.) The Muslim Brotherhood Movement Homepage seems to have been created in the United Kingdom, and the disclaimer illustrates that the maintainer of the page is not a member of the Ikhwan and does not approve or agree with everything it espouses. The page was created for educational purposes and has no connection to any organization. Nonetheless it is an excellent summary of Brotherhood objectives, themes, and history. No date or author appears on the website.

(5.) Commins, 131-33.

(6.) Mir Zohair Husain, Global Islamic Politics (New York: HarperCollins Publishers, 1995), 53-54.

(7.) Abdullah Imam, Abd-al-Nasser wa Al-Ikhwan al-Muslimoon: Al-Unf al-Deene fee Misr (Nasser and the Muslim Brotherhood: Islamic Violence in Egypt)(Cairo: Daral-Khiyal Printers, 1997), 83-90.

(8.) Ibid., 102-108.

(9.) Ibid., 92-97.

(10.) Saad Alfat, "Search into Education and Knowledge: The Ease of Influencing Young Minds," Rose-El-Yossef, 4 April 2002, 27.

(11.) Muslim Brotherhood Movement homepage.

(12.) Ibid.

(13.) Ahmed Ar-Rasheed, the Path, Muslim Brotherhood pamphlet, undated.

(14.) Ali Abd-al-Haleem, Means of Education of the Ikhwan al-Muslimoon, Muslin Brotherhood pamphlet, undated.

(15.) Hassan Al-Banna. "The Messages of Iman-ul-Shaheed Hassan Al-Banna." Muslim Brotherhood homepage, accessed 14 April 2001.

(16.) Ibid.

(17.) Muslim Brotherhood Movement homepage.

(18.) Denis J. Sullivan and Sana Abed-Kotob, Islam in Contemporary/Egypt: CMI Society vs. the State (London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1999. 132-34.

(19.) Gilles Kepel, Muslim Extremism in Egypt: The Prophet and the Pharaoh (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1985), 263-68.

Lieutenant Commander Youssef H. Aboul-Enein, U.S. Navy, is a Middle East Foreign Area Officer currently serving in the Pentagon. For the past several years, he has been working with Military Review to bring Arabic topics of military interest to the pages of the journal. Aboul-Enein wishes to thank Midshipman 2d Class Samuel Boyd, a student of government at the U.S. Naval Academy for editing and providing technical help with this article.